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Bias occurs in perceptual decisions when the reward associated with a particular
response dominates the sensory evidence in support of a choice. However, it remains
unclear how this bias is acquired and once acquired, how it influences perceptual
decision processes in the brain. We addressed these questions using model-based
neuroimaging in a motion discrimination paradigm where contextual cues suggested
which one of two options would receive higher rewards on each trial. We found that
participants gradually learned to choose the higher-rewarded option in each context
when making a perceptual decision. The amount of bias on each trial was fit well by a
reinforcement-learning model that estimated the subjective value of each option within
the current context. The brain mechanisms underlying this bias acquisition process were
similar to those observed in reward-based decision tasks: prediction errors correlated
with the fMRI signals in ventral striatum, dlPFC, and parietal cortex, whereas the amount
of acquired bias correlated with activity in ventromedial prefrontal (vmPFC), dorsolateral
frontal (dlPFC), and parietal cortices. Moreover, psychophysiological interaction analysis
revealed that as bias increased, functional connectivity increased within multiple brain
networks (dlPFC-vmPFC-visual, vmPFC-motor, and parietal-anterior-cingulate), suggesting
that multiple mechanisms contribute to bias in perceptual decisions through integration
of value processing with action, sensory, and control systems. These provide a novel link
between the neural mechanisms underlying perceptual and economic decision-making.
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INTRODUCTION
Decisions are driven both by the objective evidence presented to
an individual and by the outcomes that the individual has learned
to expect from the past. For decades, research in the neural mech-
anisms that process each of the two factors in decision-making
has proceeded in parallel with little crosstalk. The literature on
perceptual decisions has focused on how an individual’s choices
are influenced by the quality of sensory evidence, while the liter-
ature on economic decisions has emphasized how an individual’s
choices are driven by the expected reward learned from pre-
vious choice outcomes (Montague and Berns, 2002; Glimcher,
2011; Lee et al., 2012). Recently, converging evidence from ani-
mal physiology (Ding and Gold, 2013) and human neuroimaging
(Summerfield and Tsetsos, 2012) has motivated a call to inves-
tigate behavior that links these two factors in order to identify
the domain general neural mechanisms of decision-making pro-
cesses. In this vein, here we report a study that examines the
neural mechanisms underlying a well-known phenomenon—
reward-induced bias in perceptual decisions (Edwards, 1965;
Green and Swets, 1966; Maddox, 2002).
When prompted to classify sensory information as one of
the two alternatives leading to asymmetric payoffs, both humans
and animals tend to prefer the higher-rewarded alternative even
though the sensory information may suggest the lower-rewarded
alternative (Liston and Stone, 2008; Whiteley and Sahani, 2008;
Feng et al., 2009; Fleming et al., 2010; Rorie et al., 2010;
Summerfield and Koechlin, 2010; Mulder et al., 2012). In behav-
ior studies, this choice preference can be identified from the
sigmoidal relationship between the strength of sensory evidence
and the probability of choosing one of the alternatives, or psy-
chometric function. The horizontal shift of the indecision point
in the psychometric function indicates the amount of choice
preference, or bias, in perceptual decisions (Green and Swets,
1966; Macmillan and Creelman, 2004; Gold and Ding, 2013).
The choice preference also can be characterized by reaction time
since these biased choices usually are made faster (Summerfield
and Koechlin, 2010; Mulder et al., 2012). Taken together, the
drift-diffusion model analysis (Ratcliff, 1978) of the choices and
reaction time suggest that information about reward may influ-
ence the starting point for individuals to accumulate sensory
evidence in perceptual decisions (Summerfield and Koechlin,
2010; Mulder et al., 2012), such that less sensory evidence is
required in order to support the more beneficial option.
Although the phenomenon and theoretical work are well doc-
umented at the behavioral level, the neural mechanisms through
which reward information influences perceptual decisions remain
an open question. One possible mechanism is that reward repre-
sentations result in top-down influences on perceptual andmotor
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regions, similar to the effects of a task set (Summerfield et al.,
2006; Yeung et al., 2006) which selectively facilitates the sen-
sory and motor systems to favor the option with higher-reward.
If this account were valid, one would expect to observe two
results. First, the activation of frontal and parietal cortices should
positively correlate with the amount of reward-induced bias in
perceptual decisions. Second, functional connectivity between
frontal-parietal cortices and sensory-motor cortices should also
increase when individuals express bias in perceptual decisions.
However, to the best of our knowledge, only the first part of the
theory has been supported in the literature (Fleming et al., 2010;
Summerfield and Koechlin, 2010; Mulder et al., 2012); the second
part of the theory remains untested.
Another potential mechanism for the development of bias
is a reinforcement learning mechanism implemented in the
dopaminergic system (Schultz, 1998; Sutton and Barto, 1998;
Nomoto et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2012) through which information
about reward can be transformed into subjective value and influ-
ence the perceptual decision making process (Rao, 2010; Bogacz
and Larsan, 2011). This learned value may drive action selec-
tion (Wunderlich et al., 2009) and dominate sensory process in
perceptual decisions. Nevertheless, until now, no empirical study
has directly examined the involvement of reinforcement learning
signals during bias acquisition process and the integration of sub-
jective value into the neural mechanisms for perceptual decisions.
In the present study, we examined how bias is developed in
perceptual decision-making and once developed how it influences
the perceptual decision-making process in the brain. During
fMRI acquisition, participants performed a motion discrimina-
tion task (Newsome et al., 1989; Britten et al., 1993; Shadlen
and Newsome, 2001) with pre-trial cues signaling one of two
different reward contexts. Trial-wise reward feedback was deliv-
ered to participants so that a correct response to one of the
motion directions was reinforced more strongly in each reward
context. To maximize reward, the participant must combine
information about the stimulus and the potential reward, such
that predicted reward exerts a greater effect on choices when
the stimulus is weak. As the experiment proceeded, the indeci-
sion point of perceptual choices gradually shifted when it was
measured in different reward contexts. This shift was quantified
using a reinforcement-learning model that estimated the subjec-
tive value of each option according to the association of reward
prediction error (RPE) and the reward contexts (Watkins and
Dayan, 1992). Consistent with a role for value learning mech-
anisms, the RPE signals associated with the acquisition of the
bias in perceptual decisions positively correlated with the acti-
vation of ventral striatum, dlPFC, and parietal cortex. As this
bias developed, functional connectivity patterns suggested that
the value signals that contributed to bias integrate into multiple
networks involved in motor preparation (vmPFC-motor cortex),
stimulus evaluation (frontal-vmPFC-visual cortex), and cogni-
tive control (parietal-anterior cingulate cortex [ACC]) during
perceptual decision-making. These results enhance our under-
standing of the neural mechanisms underlying bias acquisition
at the computational level, and provide a fundamental linkage
between perceptual and economic decision-making processes in
the brain.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-four human participants completed the behavioral
paradigm in the MRI scanner (12 females, 12 males; age range:
18–30). One participant was excluded because of extreme param-
eter estimates (with orders of magnitude different from the other
subjects, which may be caused by excessive noise or head move-
ment) in the fMRI data analysis to ensure against violations of
normality in the group analysis. All participants were recruited
through posted flyers and were prescreened. They were free of any
self-reported neurological or psychiatric diseases, had normal or
corrected-to-normal visual acuity and normal color vision, and
right-handed. They gave written informed consent for participa-
tion. The Institutional Review Board of the University of Texas at
Austin approved all experimental procedures.
STIMULI
All stimuli were generated in Matlab version 7.10.0, using the
Psychophysics Toolbox extension, version 3.0.10 (Brainard, 1997;
Pelli, 1997). Each motion stimulus was composed of 150 white
dots moving inside a donut-shaped display patch on a black
background. The display patch was centered on the screen and
extended from 4 to 8◦ of visual-angle. Within the display patch,
every dot moved at the speed of 8◦ of visual-angle per second.
Some dots moved coherently toward one direction while the oth-
ers moved randomly. The percentage of coherently moving dots
determined the motion strength (coherence level). The presen-
tation of the dots was controlled to remove local motion signals
following the standard method for generating the motion stimuli
(Newsome et al., 1989; Britten et al., 1993; Shadlen andNewsome,
2001; Palmer et al., 2005). That is, upon stimulus onset, the dots
were presented at new random locations on each of the first three
frames. They were relocated after two subsequent frames, so that
the dots in frame 1 were repositioned in frame 4, and the dots
in frame 2 were repositioned in frame 5, etc. When repositioned,
each dot was either randomly presented at the new location or
aligned with the pre-determined motion direction (upward or
downward), depending on the pre-determined motion strength
on that trial. Each stimulus was composed of 12 video frames with
60Hz video frame refresh rates.
PROCEDURES AND TASK
Participants first performed a practice session in the laboratory to
familiarize themselves with the random-dot motion discrimina-
tion task. In the practice session, a trial began with a red fixation
cross that was presented at the center of the display screen for
1.5 s. Then, a patch of moving dots was presented for 200ms.
After the stimulus offset, participants had to decide whether the
global motion direction of these dots was upward or downward
by pressing the corresponding spatially congruent buttons within
600ms. Error feedback was presented for 1.5 s for incorrect or
slow responses; otherwise, the next trial continued immediately
with presentation of the fixation cross. On each trial, the motion
stimulus was a random sample from one of the 9 coherence levels
(0, ±6, ±12, ±64, ±80%; positive sign: upward motion, negative
sign: downward motion). The correct response for 0% coherence
trials was decided using a random number generator, so that the
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience March 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 63 | 2
Chen et al. Acquiring bias in perceptual decisions
probability of being either correct or incorrect on this trial type
was equal over the entire experiment. The total of 540 trials (9
coherence levels × 60 repetition) was broken down into six 90-
trial blocks. The participants could take a break after completing
each block.
The fMRI scan was conducted no more than 7 days after the
practice session. In the scanner, participants were asked to decide
the motion direction of moving-dots presented in two indepen-
dent reward contexts with a goal to get as many reward points as
possible over the experiment. The task structure and the timeline
of events on a trial are illustrated in Figure 1. Before a trial started,
a white fixation-cross presented at the center of the display screen
during the jittered inter-trial interval (truncated exponential dis-
tribution; mean: 4 s, range 2.7–12.7 s). At the beginning of a trial,
the color of the fixation-cross changed into either blue or yellow
for 1 s to signal the reward context of the trial. Then, a motion
stimulus was presented for 200ms. The participant had up to
800ms from stimulus onset to decide the motion direction by
pressing the corresponding button. After this 800-ms response
window, a number appeared on the screen for 1.5 s to inform
the participant how many reward points that they earned from
their decisions. The payoff of the two possible motion direction
choices was associated with the reward contexts. In one con-
text correct upward motion choices led to more reward points,
whereas in the other state correct downward motion choices led
to more reward points (Figure 1). The total reward points were
converted into US dollar as bonus at the end of the experiment.
The participants were unaware of this payoff structure before
they began the task. They were simply instructed to decide the
motion direction on each trial in order to harvest the most reward
points.
Several procedures were implemented in the experimental
design to rule out potential sources of decision bias other than
reward itself. First, each context was paired with equal numbers
FIGURE 1 | Experimental paradigm. Each trial is composed of a context,
motion stimulus (illustrated as white dots), and reward points. The number
of reward points that one can earn depends on the context and the choice.
P, probability; t, duration; AVG, average; s, second.
of trials in each motion direction and the same levels of motion
discriminability, which controlled the prior-induced bias (Green
and Swets, 1966). The motion stimulus was a random sample
from one of 7 coherence levels (0, ±4, ±12, ±64%) on each
trial. Every coherence level repeated 20 times within each state.
The total 280 trials (2 reward contexts × 7 coherence levels ×
20 repetition) were equally distributed in the 5 scanning runs for
each participant. Moreover, the presentation of reward contexts
were independent from trial to trial, which rules out the potential
confound that participants used the sequential pattern to guide
their choices (Glascher et al., 2010; Daw et al., 2011). Finally, the
response buttons and the colors of the fixation cross were counter-
balanced across participants in order to remove other potential
confounds. The participants’ choice and the reaction time were
recorded on each trial.
BEHAVIORAL DATA ANALYSIS
We applied the hierarchical logistic models to evaluate run-by-
run changes of bias and discrimination, using the lme4 pack-
age (http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lme4/index.html) in
R Version 3.0.0 (http://www.r-project.org/). The full model
included five exploratory regressors: coherence-level, reward
context, run-number, context-by-run, and coherence-by-run
interaction. The intercept was taken as a random effect across
participants.When testing the learning effects across the five scan-
ning runs, we used a Chi-square test to compare the goodness-
of-fit of this full model against the model in which either of the
interaction terms was reduced.
Furthermore, we applied computational models to capture the
cross-correlation between the feedback on the previous trial and
the choice on the next trial. We implemented two reinforcement-
learning models with different hypotheses regarding how partic-
ipants might use their experiences about contexts, choices, and
rewards to develop biases in perceptual decision-making. In each
case, a logit function was used to generate the probability of
binary choices on every trial based on the reward each participant
had received so far and the motion stimulus that was presented
on the particular trial. The models are described in detail in
the next section. Auto-correlation functions were computed from
the residuals of the best-fit learning model at the group level
using the acf function in R (Box et al., 1994; Pinheiro and Bates,
2009) to identify additional factors potentially missing in the
model.
REINFORCEMENT LEARNING MODELS
We assumed that on the tth trial, an individual chooses probabilis-
tically according to the value difference of each motion direction
(Qt(mi); a binary variable i, respectively indicating the upward
and downward motion) and the perceived motion strength. This
relationship can be described by a logit function with the linear
combination of the value difference between each motion direc-
tion and the perceived motion strength (Green and Swets, 1966;
Macmillan and Creelman, 2004). Since the perceived motion
strength was monotonic with the physical stimulus (Britten et al.,
1993), we used the coherence level on trial t (St) to model the
contribution of physical stimuli to the choice. The probability of
choosing upward motion hence is:
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Pt (m1) = 1/{1 + exp [β0 ∗ (Qt (m0) − Qt (m1)) + β1 ∗ St]} (1)
where the b0 and b1 reflected how the choice probability was influ-
enced by the subjective value difference and motion stimulus on
the current trial, respectively.
The second part of the model was constructed to simulate how
the trial-wise reward feedback was used to estimate the subjective
value of each motion direction. Two Q-learning models (Watkins
and Dayan, 1992) were separately specified such that the reward
prediction error (RPE) was used to update action value differ-
ently. The RPE was used to updated the action value pertained
to the context in one model and the action value regardless of
context in the other model.
On every trial, the context-dependent action value was
adjusted by keeping track of the context in which a choice was
made. The context-dependent RPE (δ′t) was computed as the dif-
ference between expected and the actual outcomes (rt) followed
by a choice made in the specific context. This error was scaled by
a constant learning rate (α′) and was added to the value of each
motion direction choice made in this previous context:
δt = rt − Qt (mt |ct) ,
Qt + 1 (mt |ct) = Qt (mt |ct) + α′ ∗ δ′t (2)
where ct and mt take binary values respectively for indicating the
context on trial t and the motion direction choice made in this
context.
A secondmodel was constructed based on the assumption that
context was ignored. In this case, the action value was adjusted by
adding RPE (δt), weighted by a constant learning rate (α), to the
value of each motion direction (Qt(mt)), regardless of the context
where the choice was made:
δt = rt − Qt (mt)
Qt + 1 (mt) = Qt (mt) + α ∗ δt (3)
We used the method of maximum likelihood to obtain parame-
ter estimates for each model. The likelihood that a sequence of
choice and feedback (D) was generated by a set of free parame-
ters (θM ∈ {β0, β1, α}) was the product of Equation (1) over the
total trials (Daw, 2011):
P (θM |D) ∝ P (D | θM) =
∏
t
Pt (m1 | θM) (4)
We fit each model’s free parameters by minimizing the negative
log of Equation (4) with non-linear optimization function (fmin)
in the Scipy toolbox for python (http://docs.scipy.org/doc/scipy-
0.7.x/reference/optimize.html). We initialized the value of each
motion direction choice with the participants’ initial bias toward
eithermotion direction, if they showed any in the practice session.
Once the best-fit parameters were determined for each partici-
pant, the indecision point on each trial was computed by solving
the coherence level that yielded equal chance of choosing either
motion direction given the rest of the parameters in Equation (1).
For model comparison, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
was computed by summing the negative log of Equation (4) over
all participants (n = 23) with the total number of parameters (k)
as a penalty term (Akaike, 1974):
AIC =
23∑
n= 1
∑
t
( − log (Pt (m1 |θM) ) − k)n (5)
MRI DATA ACQUISITION
Imaging data were collected using a Siemens Skyra 3T MR scan-
ner. Functional data were collected using a T2∗-weighted multi-
band echo-planar imaging sequence (Moeller et al., 2010) with
60◦ flip-angle (TR: 2 s; TE: 30ms; FOV: 256mm, multi-band
acceleration factor: 2, parallel acceleration factor: 2, matrix size:
128). Forty-eight oblique axial slices were collected in interleaved
fashion with 2mm isotropic resolution. To reduce dropout in
orbito-frontal cortex, the slices were tilted at a 10–15◦ angle off of
the anterior-commissure-posterior-commissure line and higher-
order shimming was applied. T1-weighted anatomical images
were collected using an MP-RAGE sequence with 9◦ flip angle
(TR: 1.9 s; TE: 2.43ms; FOV: 256mm; Matrix size: 256 × 256,
192 slices; slice thickness: 1mm).
IMAGE PREPROCESSING AND REGISTRATION
FMRI data preprocessing was carried out using FSL Version 5.0.1
(FMRIB’s Software Library: www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/). All image
time series were aligned with theMCFLIRT tool, and the resulting
motion parameters were used to compute frame-wise displace-
ment (FD) and temporal derivative of the root mean square
variance over voxels (DVARS) to identify bad time points (FD >
0.5; DVARS > 0.5) (Power et al., 2012). The skull was removed
from the functional images with the brain extraction tool (BET)
and from the structural images using FreeSurfer (https://surfer.
nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/). Spatial smoothing was applied using a
Gaussian kernel of FWHM 5mm. The grand-mean intensity was
normalized over the entire 4D dataset by a single multiplica-
tive factor, and a high-pass temporal filtering (Gaussian-weighted
least-squares straight line fitting, with sigma = 50.0 s). This same
high-pass filter was applied to the design matrix for analyz-
ing the fMRI time-series. All functional images were registered
to the high resolution structural image using Boundary-Based
Registration (BBR) then the high resolution structural image to
the MNI-152 2mm template using the FLIRT linear registration
(12 DOF) tool of FSL.
fMRI ANALYSIS
We used multi-stage general linear model (GLM) approach to
analyze the brain imaging data, using FSL FEAT (FMRI Expert
Analysis Tool) Version 6.00. The first-level model was estimated
separately for each run and each participant. All five runs were
combined within participant using a fixed-effects model. At the
group level, the FLAME 1mixed-effects model of FSL was applied
to all participants. All the statistical maps were corrected by
cluster-based random field theory using clusters determined by
Z > 2.3 and a family-wise error corrected cluster significance
threshold of P = 0.05 (Worsley, 2001). The statistics maps of all
analyses were projected onto the group-averaged brain from this
study for visualization.
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GLM model
The first level of GLM contained parametric modulated regres-
sors to identify the brain mechanisms underlying the acquisition
of bias in perceptual decisions as well as nuisance regressors
to control for potential confounds. The parametric modulated
regressors included (1) the absolute value of the coherence level
(duration between the onset and offset of the stimulus), (2)
the trial-wise amount of bias (duration between trial onset and
stimulus offset), and (3) the reward prediction error derived
from both learning models (duration between the onset and
offset of the reward feedback). The amount of the bias was
derived as the absolute value of the difference between the
two choices from the best-fit reinforcement-learning model at
the group-level for each participant. All the values of paramet-
ric modulated regressors were mean-centered before entering
the GLM. Nuisance regressors in the model were (1) a box-
car regressor encoding trial-evoked activity (duration between
the onset of the context and the next ITI), (2) a boxcar regres-
sor between the stimulus onset and the time when a key press
was detected to control the reaction time (RT), and (3) a con-
found file including all the motion correction parameters (esti-
mated translation and rotation and their first derivatives, FD,
and DVARS) together with single-time-point regressors for each
time point that exceeded the FD/DVARS thresholds (which effec-
tively performs “scrubbing” of those time points) (Power et al.,
2012). All the regressors except the motion-correction regres-
sors in the first-level model were convolved with a double-
gamma hemodynamic response function. Their temporal deriva-
tives were also included in the model to accommodate for
potential slice timing differences. Except for the RT regressor
that was orthogonalized relative to the regressor for the trial-
evoked activity, all other regressors entered the GLM without
orthogonalization.
Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis
To examine the effect of the value system on the acquisition pro-
cess of the bias in perceptual decisions, we define a seed region
(10-mm sphere around the vmPFC; MNI coordinates: X = −6,
Y = 39, Z = −8) according to previous results on value-based
decisions (Tom et al., 2007). Likewise, to examine the effect of the
fronto-parietal system on the acquisition of bias, we defined seed
regions for frontal cortex (MNI coordinates: X = −45, Y = 21,
Z = 0) and parietal cortex (MNI coordinates: X = −36, Y = −
39, Z = 45) that have been replicated by previous study on the
bias in perceptual decisions (Fleming et al., 2010; Summerfield
and Koechlin, 2010). The BOLD activation of the seed regions was
extracted from each participant’s individual brain in each run.
For each individual and each run, the neural signal of the seed
region was estimated by deconvolving the BOLD signals using
the deconvolution algorithm of SPM (Gitelman et al., 2003). The
interaction between the seed region and the regressor modulated
by trial-wise amount of bias was generated in the neural domain
and then reconvolved with hemodynamic function. The first-
level design matrix of the PPI analysis was the above-mentioned
GLM design matrix with two additional regressors: (1) the raw
time course extracted from the seed, and (2) a PPI regressor (the
interaction between the amount of bias and the mean BOLD
response in the seed region) with duration between the trial onset
and the stimulus offset.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
To visualize how the decisions changed as the experiment
unfolded, the group average of the choice probability in each
context is plotted against the coherence level across the five
runs (Figure 2A; solid dots). We first applied hierarchical logis-
tic regression models to identify the factors driving the changes
over the experiment. The intercept of each of these models was
taken as a random effect across individual participants. The full
model assumes that both the participants’ ability to discrimi-
nate motion direction and their preference for one of the motion
directions changes from run to run in the experiment. If either
of these factors is not constant over the experiment, removing
either term from the full model should significantly reduce the
model fit to the data. We used a Chi-square test for model com-
parison to evaluate whether the drop in goodness-of-fit between
the full and the reduced models reaches significance. We find that
the interaction between coherence level and run number can be
eliminated from the full model (χ2 (4) = 6.15, p = 0.1881 >
α = 0.05), suggesting that the participants’ ability to discrim-
inate motion direction did not change significantly over the
entire experiment. However, removing the interaction between
the reward context and the run number from the full model sig-
nificantly reduces the model fit to the data (χ2 (4) = 72.22, p <
0.0001), suggesting that the degree of bias did change across runs
of the experiment. In other words, the best-fit model contains
only the interaction between the run number and the reward
context.
We further examined how the trial-wise reward feedback can
account for the changes of the intercepts in perceptual decisions
from trial to trial. The first hypothesis is that in addition to the
motion stimulus presented on the current trial, the participants
may also utilize the previous reward that had been received in a
particular context to guide the next choice that would be made
in the same context (formalized in Equation 2). Alternatively, the
participants may simply adjust their perceptual choice according
to the reward obtained directly on the previous trial (indepen-
dent of context) as well as the strength of the motion stimulus
that is presented in front of them (formalized in Equation 3).
These two possibilities were evaluated through model compari-
son. As listed in Table 1, we find that the reinforcement-learning
model that associates previous reward and the next choice in the
same context (Equation 2) fits the data better than the learn-
ing model that ignores the context (Equation 3). Furthermore,
combining each participant’s data and the best parameters in
this reinforcement-learning model (Equations 1 and 2), we are
able to infer the trajectory of the indecision points from trial
to trial (Figure 2B) and reproduce the choice probability up to
the final trial of each run (solid lines in Figure 2A) at the group
level.
One may suspect that the participant simply applied pre-
existing knowledge about perceptual uncertainty and reward
to make a choice rather than adjusting their choice from
trial to trial (Whiteley and Sahani, 2008). If this is the case,
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FIGURE 2 | Behavioral results. (A) Psychometric function. The motion
strength was plotted against the probability of choosing “up” in each context
across the five runs (dots). This change is modeled with logit function in
which its intercept reflects the value difference between the two motion
directions that has been learned up to the end of each run (solid lines). The
dashed lines are the indecision points. Motion strength: the percentage of
coherent moving-dots; ±: upward/downward motion. Error bars: ±1 s.e.m.
(B) The bias acquisition process. The trial numbers are plotted against the
indecision points estimated by the reinforcement-learning model using
individuals’ data. Solid lines: group mean. Shaded areas: ±1 s.e.m. Dashed
lines: the end of each run. Colors: corresponding to the reward context as
illustrated in (A). (C) The autocorrelation functions. The correlation estimates
using the residuals from the context-based learning model is plotted against
each lag. Solid lines: group average. Dashed lines: 95% confidence interval of
the autocorrelation estimated from a random series with the same number of
trials (a total of 280 trials).
the above-mentioned hierarchical logistic regression model that
treats each choice as an independent observation should fit the
data better than the reinforcement-learning model that accounts
for the cross-correlation between previous decision outcome and
the next choice made in the same context. The result of model
comparison indicates that the reinforcement-learning model does
provide a better fit to the data than the hierarchical logistic regres-
sion model that can possibly best account for the obtained data
(Table 1). This suggests that the bias in perceptual decisions was
acquired through trial-wise adjustment according to contextual
feedback in our task.
One may also suspect that in addition to the context and
reward association, the previous choice (Lau and Glimcher, 2005)
or even the sequential structure of stimulus types (Cho et al.,
2002) alone could contribute to the observed bias. We calcu-
lated the average correlation between residuals that are lagged
behind a certain number of trials (autocorrelation functions)
after the context and reward association has been accounted for in
the reinforcement-learning model. If the response-by-response or
stimulus-by-stimulus structure was an additional source of bias in
our experiment, we should observe that some of the autocorrela-
tions in the residuals are significantly non-zero since these factors
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Table 1 | Best-fitting parameter estimates.
Parameters Learning model I (contextual action-outcome
association; Equations 1 and 2)
Learning model II (action-outcome
association; Equations 1 and 3)
Hierarchical logistic regression
(context by run number interaction)
b0 0.81 (0.39, 1.23) 1.03 (0.01, 1.44) –
α 0.02 (0.009, 0.03) 0.01 (0.006, 0.02) –
b1 4.01 (3.54, 4.80) 3.54 (2.47, 4.11) –
AIC 6672.9 7770.24 6962
N(fit)/N(total) 21/23 2/23 –
The parameter values are shown as median and the interquartile range (25th, 75th percentile) across participants. Also shown are the proportions of participants
whose data are better fit by each of the learning model. Bold fonts, the best-fit model; N, the number of participants; AIC, Akaike’s Information Criterion.
were ignored in the learning model. As illustrated in Figure 2C,
we compared the autocorrelation functions estimated from the
residuals against those estimated from an independent random
process with the same number of trials. The dashed horizon-
tal lines show the 95% confidence intervals for autocorrelations
expected from an independent random process. All the auto-
correlations estimated from the residuals fall well within this
confidence interval. This suggests that there is no appreciable
temporal structure in the residuals after the context and reward
association was taken into account.
NEUROIMAGING RESULTS
The neural correlates of the acquired bias in perceptual decisions
Through the analyses of the behavioral data, we found that
the amount of the bias in perceptual decisions on each trial
can be modeled as the subjective value difference between the
two motion directions at that particular time point of the
reinforcement-learning process. If the bias in perceptual deci-
sions is acquired through the dopaminergic system as in value-
based decision-making (Nomoto et al., 2010; Rao, 2010; Bogacz
and Larsan, 2011), we would expect to see the activation of
the value-based decision network (Bartra et al., 2013) to posi-
tively correlate with the amount of bias that has been acquired
prior to each trial of the experiment. Using the absolute value
difference between the two motion directions in each context
(estimated from the best-fit reinforcement-learning model) as
a parametric modulated regressor, we find that the activation
of vmPFC and midbrain dopaminergic areas positively corre-
lates with the amount of bias acquired in each reward context
(Figure 3; Table 2). Moreover, we find that the amount of bias
acquired through reinforcement has a wider influence on the per-
ceptual decision networks in the brain (Figure 3; Table 2). In
addition to the fronto-parietal cortices observed using explicit
instructions about reward (Fleming et al., 2010; Summerfield and
Koechlin, 2010; Mulder et al., 2012), we also observe that the
activation in the visual and motor cortices positively correlate
with the amount of acquired bias from trial to trial. No regions
showed negative correlations with this regressor after whole-brain
correction.
Learning signals for the acquisition of bias in perceptual decisions
Human fMRI studies have identified that when individuals
use reward feedback to adjust the subjective value of each
possible action, the signal pertaining to the difference between
the expected and actual reward (reward prediction error, RPE)
is represented in ventral striatum, a major target of midbrain
dopaminergic neurons (Pagnoni et al., 2002). Recent findings fur-
ther distinguish that when multiple reward contexts are involved
in a task, the activation of fronto-parietal cortices in addition
to the ventral striatum correlates with the PE signals (Glascher
et al., 2010; Daw et al., 2011). Following the same framework, our
reinforcement-learning model assumes that the bias in perceptual
decisions is acquired from adjusting the subjective value of each
action (motion directions) in the context using prediction errors.
Based on the above-mentioned findings, we suspect that our task
may involve two types of RPE signals. One is derived from the
action-outcome association; the other is derived from the action-
outcome association that is contingent on a specific context. We
used two learning models (see Materials and Methods section for
details) to generate each type of RPE as parametric modulated
regressors in order to search for its neural correlates.
We found that in perceptual decisions, both the context-based
and context-free RPE regressor reveals a similar pattern of brain
activation. Activation in ventral striatum, fronto-parietal, visual,
and motor cortices positively correlated with both RPE signals
when each of the regressors was modeled separately in a GLM.
This pattern is consistent with the meta-analysis result of RPE sig-
nals in the brain elicited by economic decisions (Garrison et al.,
2013). However, distinct patterns were revealed when both of the
regressors were presented together in the same GLMwithout orth-
ognization. The RPE derived from the contextual action-outcome
association positively correlated with the ventral striatum, the
fronto-parietal cortices, and the posterior and anterior cingulate
gyrus (Figure 4, yellow-red; Table 2). In contrast, PE signals from
the context-free RL model positively correlated with activity in
the visual and motor cortices (Figure 4, blue-light blue; Table 2).
Generally, collinearity between regressors weakens the statisti-
cal power to detect the correlation between dependent variables
and the independent variable. Given this situation, the significant
correlation reported here implies that these effects may be quite
large. Although interesting, testing whether the different patterns
suggest dissociated mechanisms is beyond the limitation of our
statistical methods.
One may argue that the activation pattern that uniquely cor-
relates with the context-based RPE simply reflects the level of
surprise (Ding and Gold, 2010; Gottlieb, 2012) that has noth-
ing to do with whether the actual outcomes are better or worse
than one’s expectation. We therefore added the absolute value of
www.frontiersin.org March 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 63 | 7
Chen et al. Acquiring bias in perceptual decisions
FIGURE 3 | The acquired bias in the bran. The maps show the brain areas
whose activation positively correlates with the amount of acquired bias on
each trial. No brain areas negatively correlate with this signal after the
whole-brain correction of multiple comparisons. All maps are presented at
p < 0.05 whole-brain corrected using cluster-based Gaussian random field
and overlaying on the mean anatomical images from the group of
participants. R, right hemisphere; L, left hemisphere; Z, the MNI coordinate
of the axial slice.
this RPE (i.e., unsigned RPE) into the above-mentioned model
to account for the level of surprise. The signed context-based
RPE still elicits the same activation pattern (whole-brain cor-
rected) as described above after the level of surprise is controlled
in the statistical model. No brain regions show activation that
correlates with the level of surprise (i.e., unsigned RPE) after
whole-brain correction for multiple comparisons, hence ruling
out this potential confound in our results.
The changes in functional connectivity as the bias grows
We further tested the hypothesis that bias occurs in perceptual
decision-making when the information about reward modu-
lates functional connectivity within perceptual decision networks
(Liston and Stone, 2008; Bogacz and Larsan, 2011). One the-
ory suggests that the frontal and parietal cortices may provide
top-down influence to selectively facilitate the visual representa-
tion in favors for the higher-valued option (Summerfield et al.,
2006; Fleming et al., 2010). This assumption implies that we
should expect to see increased functional connectivity between
the frontal/parietal and the visual cortices as individuals acquire
bias in perceptual decisions. Furthermore, our learning model
assumes that the bias in perceptual decisions at the behavioral
level reflects the subjective value difference between each action
(i.e., choosing one of the two motion directions) in the current
context. This assumption then suggests that the functional con-
nectivity between the value and motor system should increase
over time, as the participants learn more about the value of each
option.
We use psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis to
examine how the interaction among these functionally specialized
networks changes as individuals acquire bias in perceptual deci-
sions. The above-mentioned brain areas (i.e., frontal, parietal, and
value systems) are selected according to the previous literature
and used as the seed regions in three independent PPI analyses.
We centered the seed regions of frontal and parietal cortices at the
MNI coordinates in which the BOLD signals have been repeat-
edly shown to correlate with the magnitudes of reward-induced
bias in perceptual decisions (Fleming et al., 2010; Summerfield
and Koechlin, 2010). The vmPFC were selected with the MNI
coordinates where its peak response to reward was observed in
value-based decisions (Tom et al., 2007).
We find that as people acquire bias in perceptual decision, the
information about reward formed three different sets of func-
tional connectivity patterns that were more complicated than
expected based upon the current literature. The information
about reward actually was integrated into three distinct functional
connectivity patterns among visual, motor, and cognitive control
systems (Figure 5; Table 3). First, using the left frontal cortex as
a single seed region, its connectivity with vmPFC, ventral stria-
tum, and visual cortex increased as bias grew. Second, using the
left parietal cortex as the seed region, its connectivity with ACC
increased as bias grew. Finally, using vmPFC as the seed region of
the value system in the PPI analysis, we find that the task-related
interaction between vmPFC and left motor cortex increases as the
amount of bias increases over the experiment (notice that our par-
ticipants used their right hand to press response buttons in the
experiment).
DISCUSSION
In this report, we demonstrated a neurocomputational basis for
the development of bias in perceptual decision-making.We found
that in perceptual decisions, individuals constantly learn the val-
ues of the two potential perceptual choices (e.g., the two motion
directions in our task) by associating the deviation between the
expected and actual outcome (RPE) with each reward context.
When the context is clearly indicated, a perceptual choice reflects
the sum of the present sensory information and the expected
value difference between the two options that has been learned
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Table 2 | GLM results.
Effect Brain regions Cluster size (voxels) p-value z-value MNI coordinates
X Y Z
Acquired bias Frontal orbital cortex 1336 <0.0001 4.13 46 20 −12
Superior frontal gyrus 949 <0.0001 3.37 0 34 50
Inferior frontal gyrus 766 <0.0001 3.77 −54 24 12
Posterior supramarginal gyrus 729 <0.0001 3.98 −52 −46 10
Superior lateral occipital cortex 692 <0.0001 3.48 −12 −84 38
Posterior middle temporal gyrus 364 <0.0001 3.25 62 −30 −16
Postcentral gyrus 262 <0.0001 3.55 2 −34 52
Brain-stem 237 <0.0001 3.89 14 −22 −14
Middle frontal gyrus 167 <0.0001 3.13 38 0 64
Precentral gyrus 163 <0.0001 3.17 44 0 34
Frontal medial cortex 105 0.005 2.95 0 46 2
Posterior superior temporal gyrus 100 0.007 3.16 58 −34 4
Frontal pole 94 0.011 3.40 −28 52 34
Temporal pole 91 0.014 3.26 −54 4 −24
Contextual RPE Superior lateral occipital cortex 3635 <0.0001 4.28 50 −62 24
Posterior supramarginal gyrus 1596 <0.0001 4.39 −50 −48 52
Superior frontal gyrus 1395 <0.0001 4.26 −16 18 52
Posterior middle temporal gyrus 1189 <0.0001 4.26 −62 −40 −8
Middle frontal gyrus 1134 <0.0001 3.69 38 26 52
Frontal medial cortex 1065 <0.0001 4.43 2 44 −4
Posterior cingulate gyrus 1063 <0.0001 3.80 0 −36 42
Frontal pole 443 <0.0001 3.58 50 44 20
Inferior lateral occipital cortex 308 <0.0001 3.15 42 −78 −2
Right caudate 270 <0.0001 4.42 12 12 4
Cerebellum 234 <0.0001 4.15 −40 −68 −38
Frontal pole 194 <0.0001 3.85 −20 36 −16
Left caudate/Accumbens 170 <0.0001 4.01 −10 10 0
Frontal orbital cortex 100 0.002 3.39 −26 22 −20
Anterior parahippocampal gyrus 67 0.037 3.37 20 −2 −26
Context-free RPE Occipital pole 179 <0.0001 3.49 28 −96 16
Pre-central gyrus 101 0.002 3.28 −48 −18 52
so far. At the neural level, the activation of ventral striatum,
frontal, and parietal cortices is positively correlated with the
contextual RPE derived from modeling each individual’s perfor-
mance over the experiment. Moreover, through this reinforce-
ment learning mechanism implemented in the dopaminergic
system, over the experiment, the value signals became increas-
ingly integrated over the learning period with neural systems
involved in action, stimulus evaluation, and cognitive control
that gradually influence ones’ perceptual decisions. These results
reveal the shared neural mechanism between perceptual and
economic decisions, and highlight the involvement of multiple
control networks that are sensitive to reward during perceptual
decision-making.
There is increasing convergence across different neuroscience
methods and across species regarding the involvement of rein-
forcement learning processes in perceptual decisions. Most of
these findings focus on the improvement in individuals’ abil-
ity to detect or discriminate sensory information, or perceptual
learning (Law andGold, 2008; Kahnt et al., 2011). Here, we extend
this line of research by showing that bias in perceptual decision-
making can also be acquired through similar learningmechanism.
Given the commonality between our findings and the findings in
perceptual learning, one may suspect that the RPE signals that
we report in ventral striatum, frontal, and parietal cortices may
simply reflect perceptual learning (Kahnt et al., 2011) rather than
the development of bias. However, we found that participants’
ability to discriminate the motion direction did not improve sig-
nificantly over the experiment. In addition, our experiment may
be too short to elicit the effect of perceptual learning, which usu-
ally requires more than a thousand trials (Law and Gold, 2008;
Kahnt et al., 2011). This mismatched temporal dynamic between
perceptual learning and the acquisition of bias further rules out
this alternative interpretation.
Our findings also speak to the great interest in the liter-
ature regarding the integration of reward and sensory infor-
mation in the brain during perceptual decisions. Perceptual
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FIGURE 4 | The reward prediction errors. The brain maps show the regions
whose activation positively correlates with the two types of reward
prediction error signals in perceptual decisions after adjusting one type over
the other. All maps are presented at p < 0.05 whole-brain corrected using
cluster-based Gaussian random field and overlaying on the mean anatomical
images from the group of participants. Red-Yellow, context-based RPE;
Blue-Light-blue, context-free RPE; R, right hemisphere; L, left hemisphere; Z,
the MNI coordinate of the axial slice.
decision-making involved neural processes of accumulating evi-
dence (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001), selecting action (Filimon
et al., 2013), and central execution such as speed-accuracy trade-
offs or decision caution (Palmer et al., 2005; Forstmann et al.,
2010). Theories and evidence suggests that information about
reward influences the higher level of perceptual decision hier-
archy (frontal and parietal cortices) and the downstream visual
and motor processes (Liston and Stone, 2008; Serences, 2008;
Fleming et al., 2010; Summerfield and Koechlin, 2010; Mulder
et al., 2012). Our finding extends this view by showing how func-
tional connectivity patterns changed as individuals learned to use
the reward information to guide perceptual choices from trial to
trial. According to our PPI results, the influences of reward on
these perceptual decision components speak against a single top-
down facilitation process within the perceptual decision hierarchy
(Fleming et al., 2010; Summerfield and Koechlin, 2010). The
information of reward integrates into sensory evaluation through
the functional connection among visual, vmPFC, and lateral pre-
frontal cortices. Its influence on motor planning is evident in
the increased functional connectivity between vmPFC and motor
cortex rather than direct effects from lateral PFC.
Since perceptual decisions are usually analyzed under the
framework of drift-diffusion process, one obvious question is
how our finding relates to this tradition. In fact, many theoret-
ical approaches have been proposed to account for the function
of basal ganglia and its contribution to the learning of the bias
in perceptual decisions in terms of drift-diffusion process (Rao,
2010; Bogacz and Larsan, 2011). However, it is very challenging
to empirically test these theories at the whole brain level. The dif-
ficulty is that bias induced by reward usually is weak in human
studies using reaction time tasks (Mulder et al., 2012) because
of the speed-accuracy trade-off (Maddox and Bohil, 1998; Simen
et al., 2009). In order to investigate the acquisition process of
the bias in perceptual decisions, we applied a decision deadline
to boost the effect of reward-induced bias since this type of bias
usually occurs in fast choices and suggests the influence on the
starting point of the drift-diffusion process (Summerfield and
Koechlin, 2010; Mulder et al., 2012; White and Poldrack, 2014).
Using this manipulation, we present the first empirical evidence
showing the role of basal ganglia in the acquisition of the bias
in perceptual decisions and three functional connectivity pat-
terns pertaining to express this acquired bias in the human brain.
However, the drawback of this speeded-response manipulation
is that it limits the interpretation of our finding to the speeded
decisions and prevents us from applying the drift-diffusionmodel
to the present data. Future work should focus on identifying the
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FIGURE 5 | Three functional connectivity patterns underlying the growth
of bias. The left panel shows the seed regions that were used in the
psychophysiological interaction analyses. These seed regions were selected
according to the literature and centered at the MNI coordinates (vmPFC: [−6,
39, −8]; left-frontal: [−45, 21, 0]; left-parietal: [−36, −39, 45]) with the radius
of 10mm. The brain maps on the right panel show the areas that positive
correlate with the interaction between each of the seed regions and the
amount of acquired bias on each trial. The statistical maps are corrected for
multiple comparisons at the whole-brain level using cluster-based Gaussian
random field correction at P < 0.05 and overlaying on the mean anatomical
images from the group of participants. R, right hemisphere; L, left
hemisphere; X, Y, Z, the MNI coordinate of the brain slice.
Table 3 | PPI results.
Seed regions Co-activating brain
regions
Cluster size
(voxels)
p-value z-value MNI coordinates
X Y Z
vmPFC (MNI coordinates [x, y, z] = [−6, 39, 8]) Pre-central gyrus 56 0.037 3.44 −36 −28 68
(Left) Frontal cortex (MNI coordinates [x, y,
z] = [−45, 21, 0])
Occipital pole 325 <0.0001 3.27 22 −92 −2
Paracingulate gyrus 131 <0.0001 3.42 0 54 16
Frontal medial cortex 117 <0.0001 3.24 −4 38 −20
Occipital fusiform gyrus 90 0.003 3.10 −48 −70 −26
Right putamen/Caudate 63 0.039 3.09 18 16 −4
(Left) Parietal cortex (MNI coordinates [x, y,
z] =[−36, −39, 45])
Anterior cingulate cyrus 98 0.001 3.07 10 38 6
Paracingulate gyrus 71 0.009 3.37 18 52 2
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neural mechanisms by which bias presents as individuals freely
adjust reaction time in order to maximize reward.
Finally, one may be interested in whether the participants were
aware of the payoff structure or not during the experiment. We
prompted the participants to report their strategies after finish-
ing the experiment. However, most of them simply said that they
did their best in classifying the motion direction and some trials
were very difficult. Some of them felt that the payoffs somehow
depended on the color of the cues; however, no participants ver-
balized the specific rule. Determining whether the participants
used explicit or implicit knowledge about the payoff structure
is beyond the scope of this paper, given our lack of sensitive
assessments of explicit knowledge.
In conclusion, the present study shows that bias in percep-
tual decision-making can arise from the neural mechanisms that
learn the association between contexts and choice outcomes. The
learning signals (contextual RPE) are observed in ventral stria-
tum, frontal, and parietal cortices. The acquired bias mirrors the
learned value difference between each perceptual choice at the
behavioral level and correlates with multiple connectivity pat-
terns as such bias grows. This indicates that the information
about value contributes to bias in perceptual decision-making
through modulating multiple systems (perceptual-, decision-,
and action-networks) instead of a single top-down process, as
usually suggested in the literature. Our results hence demon-
strate the pervasive effects of reinforcement learning mechanisms
on the whole-brain connectivity by which the subjective expec-
tation of reward colors the process of objective evidence in
decision-making.
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